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Abstract: The Nigerian state is caught in the crossfire of national insecurity arising from the 
insurgency of various rogue groups. The most prominent of these groups, and one whose 
activities have had far-reaching destabilising effect on the polity, is the Boko Haram sect. 
The Boko Haram sect, which uses the Taliban- and al-Qaeda-style terrorist tactics of suicide 
bombing and targeted assassination, is responsible for between 3000 and 4000 deaths since 
it declared war and engaged in armed insurgency in 2009. The sect has targeted and bombed 
state institutions, the United Nations building as well as many Christian worship centres in 
furtherance of its avowed objective of deploying terror to achieve the islamisation of the 
Nigerian state. Relying on secondary sources of data, the paper interrogates the force theory 
that underpins Nigeria’s security engineering and contends that the continued insecurity in 
the polity is a demonstration of its ineffectiveness. The paper also contends that the 
proposition by the Federal Government to grant amnesty to the Boko Haram sect is not as 
simplistic as it appears as it transcends the narrow definitional criteria of bartering 
forgiveness for peace. While the paper is critical of the proposed amnesty programme, it 
advocates a holistic approach that incorporates other issues that are promotive of justice, 
morality and ethicalness in the polity.  
 
Introduction 
The major challenge of Nigeria’s 
national security is the containment 
of diverse manifestations of violence 
spearheaded by various rogue 
groups. The major group in 
contemporary Nigeria that has 
stretched the resources, expertise, 
patience and even the competence of 
Nigeria’s security apparatuses to the 
limit, both individually and 
collectively, is the Boko Haram sect. 
The sheer number of deaths arising 
from bomb attacks orchestrated by 
the Boko Haram far outstrips any 
other cause of death in Nigeria, 
including epidemics (Bankong-Obi 
2012).  
 
One of the shortcomings of Nigeria’s 
security management is its pro-realist 
orientation that accords the 
deployment of force preeminent 
position. Thus, the strategy of choice 
among national security managers is 
the use of force in various guises to 
subdue those identified as 
threatening national security. But the 
government’s supposed superior 
force has not rolled back the menace 
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of insecurity which creates the 
impression that the government is 
not doing enough to secure the 
people. This mindset led Bankong-
Obi (2012) to attribute Nigeria’s 
intractable security challenges to 
government’s apathy towards 
exterminating the terror group and 
inefficiency on the part of the 
security agencies. The Boko Haram 
sect poses a security challenge that is 
alien to Nigeria’s regular security 
problems. While the use of force 
might have worked in the past, it has 
proved inefficient in the case of 
Boko Haram. This is so for four 
major reasons: one, the Boko Haram 
uses al-Qaeda-style terror strategies, 
which combine suicide bombing, 
targeted assassination and guerrilla 
strategies to unleash violence on the 
polity; two, the sect has diffuse 
leadership system, making it 
impossible to initiate dialogue; three, 
its ideology is anchored on 
irrationality driven by utopian 
anarchism; and lastly, it has shifting 
membership that is patently faceless. 
The anarchist bent of the Boko 
Haram worldview is validated by its 
bomb attacks on Christian worship 
centres as well Muslims considered 
as not practising orthodox Islam 
(Onuoha 2012:2).  
 
The persistence of bomb attacks by 
the Boko Haram sect despite an all-
out deployment of force by the state 
and the clamour by Nigerians for the 
government to find a lasting solution 
to the problem of insecurity appeared 
to have swayed government towards 
the adoption of non-military option 
of amnesty. The present amnesty 
being proposed by the Jonathan 
administration seems to be driven by 
narrow political considerations. 
Amnesty is not imposed by fiat but 
emerges through negotiated 
arrangement based on certain defined 
conditions. The government had 
unequivocally set those conditions 
earlier namely, that it would not 
negotiate with ghosts, due to the 
sect’s faceless leadership and 
membership; and that the sect must 
present its basis of grievances as a 
platform for dialogue (BBC 2012; 
Guardian 2013a).  
 
The paper acknowledges that 
amnesty is a political tool designed 
to stop violence and restore peace 
but argues that it must be driven by 
the tenets of justice. The paper 
further contends that the 
unilateralism of the proposed 
amnesty represents a policy 
summersault which might deepen 
insecurity rather than resolve it. It 
holds that the sustainability of any 
form of amnesty programme for the 
Boko Haram sect must factor in the 
victims of their terrorist attacks.  
 
Contending Issues in Nigeria’s 
National Security Architecture 
Internationally and domestically, the 
issue of national security is 
constantly on the front burner (Obi 
1997; Tyoden 2005). Irrespective of 
the regime type that is in control of 
governmental powers within states or 
the configuration of powers in the 
global arena, the preoccupation with 
national security has not diminished 
in importance since the emergence of 
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state system. Within nation-states, 
whether it is military authoritarian 
regimes or civil democratic 
governments, considerations 
surrounding national security sit at 
the apex of the hierarchy of states’ 
national interest. At the core of these 
considerations are the twin issues of 
regime survival and the preservation 
of the territorial integrity of the state 
system. 
 Overtime, especially in the cold war 
era, the preoccupation of states with 
national security defined within the 
parametric confines of regime and 
state survival made its pursuit an end 
by itself rather than a means to an 
end. The effect was that states 
became fixated with developing the 
necessary capacity to ensure the 
survival of the government in power 
as well as preserve the state system 
from collapse arising from both 
internal and external threats and 
sabotage.  
 
This traditional realist mindset 
underpinned the equation of national 
security with the absence of threats 
to governmental authority or the 
presence of domestic capacity to 
contain centrifugal forces within the 
polity (Omeje 2006). Thus, under 
this paradigm, national security was 
conceptualised within the parametric 
context of innate and acquired 
capacity of governments to ensure 
the protection of their countries from 
external attacks or internal 
subversion, as well as the 
preparedness of the military to 
protect state territories. It also was 
interpreted as diligence in matters of 
intelligence gathering and secrecy, 
and the protection of resources and 
rights considered critical to the 
functioning of states (UNDP 1994; 
Encarta 2008; Nnoli 2006). 
 
The core essence of this 
conceptualisation is that national 
security is motorised by the 
possession of the ensembles of 
warfare as well as the existence of 
military formations to deploy them. 
The implication, therefore, is that 
threats to national security are 
mainly external rather than internal. 
Thus, the whole essence of the 
apparatuses of force is to rebuff and 
defeat any form of threat to the state. 
As such, the achievement of national 
security falls under the exclusive 
domain of the military and 
paramilitary formations across the 
state. The shortcoming associated 
with this conceptualisation is its 
seeming restrictive boundaries and 
analytical inadequacy (UNDP 1994; 
Onuoha 2008:101; Adelugba 
2008:20; Nwolise 2008:348).   
 
The concept of national security has 
mutated from its static preoccupation 
characterised by narrow, restrictive, 
militaristic and strategic perspective 
to dynamic, broad-based 
incorporation of ensembles of 
various factors. The shift and 
expansion in the paradigmatic 
preoccupation of national security 
from traditional realist orientation to 
multilayered and broad perspective 
draws from deeper insights generated 
from other schools of thoughts. The 
various inputs from diverse 
intellectual traditions in the attempt 
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to elucidate and expand the 
traditional frontiers of national 
security have imbued the concept 
with certain mystique (Nnoli 2006:1; 
Adelugba 2008).  But attempts by 
various scholars to add quality and 
dynamism to the concept of national 
security are principally concerned 
with the issues of whose security is 
paramount and how to provide it 
(Omeje 2006:14; Onuoha 2008:102). 
The intellectual and ideological 
ferment in the expansion of the 
domain of national security is 
exemplified by their emphases on a 
bouquet of factors as its constitutive 
parameters. Thus, the traditional 
realist approach and its 
contemporary variations situate the 
core concerns of national security 
within the framework of the state and 
its national interest anchored on its 
military capability to protect both; 
the  idealist school focuses attention 
on the emancipation of the individual 
rather than the state; the 
neoclassical/liberal economistic 
theorists see national security from 
the context of economic security or 
security of the economy, which is 
achieved through the free interplay 
of market forces in the resource 
allocation processes within and 
between societies; the structural 
ecologists focus on the linkages and 
interactions of ecology and politics 
especially in terms of the 
sustainability of the planetary 
ecosystem and the balancing of the 
negative impacts of economic 
activities on natural resource 
exploitation and the unhindered 
opportunity to non-human lives to 
thrive; and Marxist political 
economy focuses on the 
reconciliation of the competing 
interests of the various classes in the 
state. To them, therefore, the national 
security cannot be understood apart 
from the interests of the social forces 
as they struggle with one another 
(Obi 1997; Omeje 2006; Nnoli 
2006).  
 
The expansion in the constituent 
elements that shape national security 
has produced a paradigmatic shift in 
contemporary definitional criteria of 
the concept.  National security, thus, 
transcends the traditional frontiers of 
state to incorporate man and his 
environment within the milieu of 
sustainability. Sustainability in 
national security means that actions 
taken by states in furtherance of the 
security concerns of the present 
generation must be such that cater 
for present needs of humans and 
non-humans alike while making 
allowances for the unconditional 
meeting of the security needs by 
future generations (UNDP 1994; 
Dobson 2000).  
 
National security in Nigeria is still 
conceived from the prism of the 
realist paradigm. Thus, the strategy 
often adopted by the Nigerian state 
to tackle insecurity consists of, and is 
anchored on, the deployment of 
superior fire power to contain what 
the state has identified as threats to 
it, which often coincide with the 
interest of the ruling elite. As a result 
of the realist orientation and mindset 
of Nigerian security thinking, the 
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Nigerian government perennially 
earmarks larger and larger portions 
of state funds for security. In the 
2012 federal budget, the Nigerian 
government allotted 19.4 percent of 
the total budget to the security 
sector. Thus, in concrete terms, the 
security sector gulped N921.91 
billion of the N4.75 trillion budgeted 
for the year (Leadership 2012). The 
logic behind the huge budgetary 
allocation to the security sector was 
to tackle the “the threat of Boko 
Haram, Niger Delta militants and 
increasing spate of insecurity and 
wanton destruction of lives and 
property by criminals which are on 
the rise"(President Jonathan cited in 
Leadership 2011). 
 
Horsfall (2013:71) observes that the 
security budget for 2012 was not 
only phenomenal but was the largest 
allocation any government had 
budgeted in the history of Nigeria for 
the security sector. The phenomenal 
increment in the security vote not 
only enlarged the resources available 
to national security managers but 
also expanded the frontiers of the 
militarisation of the polity. It equally 
acted as a necessary fodder to the 
blossoming of corruption (Elombah 
2010).  In Nigeria’s government 
circles, the security vote is not 
subject to audit verification. Once 
the security vote is captured in the 
budget, its spending is within the 
competence of the government 
officials authorised to spend it and 
the manner in which they deem its 
spending necessary is beyond audit 
query. The unaccountable nature of 
security vote led El Rufai (2012) to 
call it “slush fund”. The Human 
Rights watch (2007:39) captures it 
more succinctly thus: 
 
The security vote is a budget 
line that is meant to act as a 
source of discretionary 
spending that the executive 
arms of government can use 
to respond quickly and 
effectively to threats to 
peace and security in their 
jurisdictions. However the 
use of those funds is 
notoriously opaque; there is 
generally no requirement 
that governors or local 
government chairpersons 
account for their use of those 
funds. In many cases 
security vote money has 
been used by state and local 
governments to foment 
violence and co-opt political 
opponents or has been lost to 
graft and patronage. 
 
The militarisation of national 
security underpinned the setting up 
of coalition forces or joint task forces 
(JTF) to address sundry security 
threats. The Nigerian security 
architecture has, as its building 
blocks, such organisations as the 
police, the armed forces, and the 
various state security apparatuses, 
which are concerned with 
intelligence gathering. A consistent 
trait across the various security 
formations is the conscious efforts to 
militarise them. The Nigeria Police, 
whose primary responsibility is to 
maintain law and order, breaks them 
by converting their position into 
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veritable instrument of oppression 
and extortion (Carter and Marenin 
1979; Walker 1999:56; Hills 
2007:408; Alemika 2010).  
 
Another aspect of the militarisation 
of the police is the creation of the 
pseudo-military formation known as 
the Mobile Police (Mopol) with 
access to helicopter gunships and 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) 
as well as other ad hoc units that 
regularly compete amongst 
themselves for unleashing violence 
on the people. The JTFs are 
conferred with wide-ranging 
repressive powers. As oppression 
begets resistance, the deployment of 
force by the JTFs has neither 
diminished nor eliminated the 
incidence of insecurity in Nigeria. It 
has fostered the spirit of daring the 
state apparatuses of force, especially 
the JTFs. The creation of an 
alternative model of security 
framework to maintain internal 
security by the Nigerian government 
is a tacit acknowledgement of the 
incapacity of the police and other 
traditional institutions law 
enforcement to tackle crime. 
 
Part of the underlying causes of 
insecurity in Nigeria is the 
appropriation, personalisation and 
privatisation of state power by the 
elite and the exclusion of the masses 
from access to secure material base 
(Ake 1981:125-8; Nnoli 2006:70). 
The emergent ruling elite at the 
period of independence did not 
dismantle the apparatuses of 
oppression used by the retreating 
British colonialists but consolidated 
on them. Thus, it was merely, a 
handover from one oppressor to 
another. As Onyeozili 2005: ) 
observes, “the nationalists against 
who (sic) police terror and violence 
were used by the colonialists, and to 
whom power was subsequently 
transferred at independence, 
cushioned themselves into 
employing police brutality and terror 
against their opponents in post-
independence political power 
struggles”. 
 
Another cause is the tendency of the 
Nigerian security apparatuses to reify 
force as the whole essence of 
security. For instance, the Boko 
Haram was in existence before it 
embraced violence as its primary 
tool of operation. Its origin is traced 
to 2002 , with some scholars dating it 
as far back as 1995,  which suggests 
that prior to 2009, it operated as a 
non-violent organisation (Connell 
2012:88; The Nation 2012; BBC 
2012a; Onuoha 2012:2). It was when 
the Nigeria Police applied extreme 
force which led to the death of its 
leader, Mohammed Yusuf and over 
1,000 members of the sect that 
violence became its weapon of 
martyrdom (Onuoha 2012:3).  
 
The de-federalisation of security 
through the takeover of every aspect 
of security by the federal 
government created certain rigidity 
in the security system. The erosion 
of the federalist principles that ought 
to undergird the Nigerian state and 
all the apparatuses of governance, 
including its national security system 
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originated from two interrelated 
factors, namely, military adventure 
into the political arena and the 
unfortunate Nigerian civil war and 
its after-effects (Babawale 2007: 65). 
Although the earliest effort to 
centralise the police system was in 
1958 through the Police Act, 
Cap.154, Laws of the Federation 
(Onyeozili 2005:40), its 
consolidation was during the 
successive military regimes. One of 
the fallouts of Nigeria’s skewed 
federal structure is the removal of 
real constitutional responsibility 
from the state governors and local 
government chairmen and the 
transference of same to the federal 
government. Contradictorily, the 
governors and local government 
chairmen allocate and appropriate 
enormous resources as security vote 
under the guise of being the chief 
security officers of their respective 
domains, a situation that has the 
trappings of sleaze around it (Human 
Rights Watch 2007b).  
 
The security theorisation and 
preoccupation of the Nigerian state 
does not factor the human misery as 
a major constituent of the centrifugal 
pressures on national security. 
Human misery is seen as a 
manifestation of the consequential 
effects rather than a driving force of 
insecurity. This mindset could be 
responsible for the reactive rather 
than proactive orientation of the 
security strategies of the Nigerian 
state (Obi 1997). What this implies is 
that not only is there an absence of 
strategic security plan but also a lack 
of linkages between national security 
and provision of conditions for the 
material wellbeing of a significant 
percentage of the population. But the 
pursuit of security ought to start and 
end with the elimination of the 
factors that create, intensify and 
sustain human misery in the polity. 
As UNDP (1994:22) observes, 
“human security is not a concern 
with weapons-it is a concern with 
human life and dignity”. The dignity 
is conferred on the people by the 
responsiveness of the government to 
their social, economic, political and 
ethical needs.  
   
The Terrain of Amnesty in Nigeria 
Amnesty is a concept whose 
relevance is brought to the fore in 
conflict situations. It is associated 
with the preparedness of the state to 
suspend its powers to prosecute and 
punish individuals and groups who 
have contravened fundamental 
provisions of the laws. It involves 
the invocation of the powers of the 
state to cleanse from the official 
records of those under the purview of 
the amnesty arrangement, their 
culpability against it. Thus, amnesty 
does not operate in a vacuum but 
within the context of certain 
conditions. These conditions include: 
- It applies to rebellious acts 
against the state; 
- It is offered to a group or a 
class of criminals who may 
have committed a crime 
against the state; 
- They need not be convicted 
by a court of law. It is enough 
that there is a constitutional 
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basis upon which they can be 
ordinarily prosecuted; 
- It is extended by the state in 
order to restore tranquillity 
within its territory; 
- The felonies are expunged 
from the records of those 
concerned;  
- It is anchored on the 
fulfilment of certain 
conditions by the intended 
beneficiaries of the amnesty 
programme. It could be in 
form of signing pledges of 
good behaviour, community 
service and surrendering of 
firearms (Encarta 2008; 
Akinwale 2010:204; Olatoke 
& Olokooba 2012:27). 
 
There is fundamental misconception 
among scholars and analysts about 
the meaning and purpose of amnesty. 
This misconception is a product of 
conceptual confusion arising from 
the extrapolation of the meaning of 
amnesty from pardon (Ukaogo 2010; 
Akinwale 2010:202; Olatoke & 
Olokooba 2012:27). Sections 175 
and 212 of the Nigerian Constitution, 
1999, confer on the president and the 
governor of a state the power to 
exercise the prerogative of mercy 
after consultation with the Council of 
State or relevant advisory council 
respectively. 
 
Embedded in Section 175(1a) are the 
concepts of amnesty and pardon. The 
subsection provides that the 
president may “grant any person 
concerned with or convicted of any 
offence created by an Act of the 
National Assembly a pardon, either 
free or subject to lawful conditions”. 
An analysis of the provision brings 
to the fore its contemplation of the 
two concepts in one fell swoop. 
While the first part of that provision, 
that is, “any person concerned with” 
contemplates amnesty; the second 
part which refers to any person 
“convicted of any offence” falls 
under the purview of the concept of 
pardon. Thus, the distinction 
between the two concepts is that 
while pardon is given after a 
conviction and exempts the criminal 
from further punishment, amnesty is 
usually granted to persons who may 
have committed a crime but not 
convicted. 
 
Amnesty as a state strategy is 
deployed to contain centrifugal 
forces and maintain the corporate 
unity of the state in the face of 
seemingly intractable threats. The 
effectiveness of amnesty as a state 
strategy lies is given impetus by two 
factors: one, an unimpeachable 
demonstration of the superiority of 
the fire power of the state; and two, 
the willingness of the intended 
beneficiaries to discontinue the 
criminal activities for which amnesty 
is contemplated. The objective of 
amnesty is not to punish but to 
choose a path that will yield the best 
possible scenario for the triumph of 
peace. Thus, amnesty emphasizes the 
supremacy and expediency of a 
conducive atmosphere promotive of 
public welfare than prosecution 
(Olatoke & Olokooba 2012:26).  
 
In the course of Nigeria’s post-
colonial experience, it has deployed 
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the tool of amnesty on two 
occasions. The first was in 
connection with the Nigerian civil 
war. At the end of the war in 1970, 
the federal government declared the 
outcome of the war as “no victor, no 
vanquished”. This was a general 
amnesty that served the purpose of 
closing the unfortunate chapter 
which the war opened (Ukaogo 
2010). The introduction of what 
came to be known as 3Rs 
(reconciliation, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation) was a state policy 
designed to open a new chapter of 
reintegration of the secessionist 
Biafra into Nigeria. 
 
Although, the amnesty policy of 3Rs 
has been criticised as an empty 
rhetoric peddled to contain the 
security threat that open 
marginalisation of the Igbos would 
have spawned (Ukaogo 2010), it 
achieved the purpose of procuring a 
peaceful polity. The amnesty of the 
Nigeria-Biafra civil war appeared to 
be one-sided: rather than facilitate 
the integration of the Igbos, it 
fostered their alienation and 
relegation from the mainstream of 
Nigerian governance and economic 
structures (Ojukwu 2002; Ukaogo 
2010). What the Nigerian state 
granted Chief Chukwuemeka 
Odumegwu-Ojukwu under the 
presidency of Shehu Shagari was 
state pardon, an action that actually 
closed the chapter of the process that 
started in 1970. 
 
The next instance of amnesty was on 
25 June 2009 when Nigeria’s former 
President, the late Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua granted amnesty to the 
Niger Delta militants. For years, the 
Niger Delta was transformed into a 
cauldron of anti-state activities, 
which not only embarrassed the 
Nigerian state and undermined its 
economy but also spawned ripple 
effects in the international oil 
market. As the CBN (2009:130) 
corroborates, “declining production 
had characterized oil output over the 
previous five years due largely to 
militant activities and the attendant 
destruction of oil-production 
facilities”. The amnesty was the third 
in the line of strategies evolved by 
the Nigerian state to contain the 
destructive consequences of armed 
onslaught of the Niger Delta 
militants on the state. The two 
previous strategies were the 
bureaucratisation of the Niger Delta 
region through the creation of the 
Ministry of Niger Delta and the 
Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC), under whose 
auspices the Niger Delta Master plan 
to anchor the sustained development 
of the region was evolved (Egwemi 
2010:136). 
 
The Niger Delta amnesty programme 
represented a milestone in several 
respects. Firstly, it showed that a 
government was listening and 
willing to engage in peaceful 
resolution of the people’s grievances. 
Secondly, it marked a shift in the 
security and strategic orientation of 
the government: the government 
stood down its reliance on its 
seeming superior fire power to cow 
the people and embraced dialogue 
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anchored on voluntary renunciation 
of violence by the militants. And 
lastly, the government was willing to 
make investments outside its 
traditional security window as it 
conceptualised the amnesty 
programme to have rehabilitation 
and reintegration components. 
Indeed, the Nigerian government 
projected then that the amnesty 
programme would cost the state 
some N10.14 billion (Nwozor 
2010:29). 
 
Undoubtedly, the Niger Delta 
amnesty programme was a policy 
attempt to seek an alternative route 
to peace within the triad framework 
of anti-violence, pro-dialogue and 
welfarism (Nwozor 2010:33). But 
the pursuit of this peace was not 
without conditions. As Nwozor 
(2010:33-34) avers, “the president 
hinged the amnesty on several 
conditions: the willingness of the 
militants to give up all illegal arms in 
their possession, a complete 
renunciation of militancy in all its 
ramifications, and deposition to an 
undertaking to this effect”. The 
embracement of the programme by 
the militants enthroned peace in the 
region, which had multiplier effect 
on the Nigerian economy. As CBN 
(2009:130) acknowledges, “the 
federal Government’s amnesty 
programme brought relative peace to 
the Niger-Delta area in the second 
half of 2009. Consequently, 
production level rose from 1.75mbd 
[million barrels per day] in January 
[2009] to 1.94mbd in September 
[2009] and closed at the end of the 
year at 2.02mbd.”  
 
Boko Haram and the Spectre of 
Religious Anarchism  
The Boko Haram insurgency has 
been at the epicentre of Nigeria’s 
security crisis since it upped its 
terrorist activities in 2009. While 
both the origin and leadership 
composition of the Boko Haram sect 
are subject of speculation, their 
ideology and terrorist activities are 
not. Bagaji et al (2012:33) find 
semblance between Boko Haram and 
Maitatsine sects in terms of shared 
anarchic philosophy and objectives. 
The Boko Haram sect is professedly 
anti-west and considers terrorist 
strategy as a veritable jihadist tool to 
conquer the “infidels” (Onuoha 
2012:2). Here, infidels are defined as 
those who are outside the template of 
orthodox Islam or those who 
condone or are sympathetic to 
western education and civilisation 
(Connell 2012:90). Thus, the literal 
meaning of Boko Haram is “western 
education is sin”.  
 
The arbitrary targets of Boko 
Haram’s sustained terrorist attacks 
appear to create analytical problems 
with regard to who it categorises as 
an infidel. There has not been any 
boundary in the targets of its attacks: 
it appears to attack everybody but 
with preponderance on Christian 
institutions. Essentially, the targets 
of the attacks masterminded by the 
Boko Haram have not followed any 
particular pattern to lead to a 
plausible conclusion about their 
driving motives and ultimate goals. 
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The immediate deducible 
interpretation of their motives is that 
it intends to undermine the 
sovereignty of the Nigerian state 
through the creation of general 
insecurity by turning the country into 
a territory of anarchy. Their strategy 
could be likened to religious 
anarchism as it manifests the nature 
of, and also exemplifies the 
mainstream, terrorist tradition of the 
al-Qaeda and Taliban-style 
organisational planning and armed 
resistance (Bagaji et al 2012:33). 
  
The peculiarity and invincibility of 
the Boko Haram sect lie in its 
daredevil attacks, loose 
organisational structure, facelessness 
and surreptitious operational 
modalities.  The Boko Haram does 
not seem to harbour any genuine 
grievances against the Nigerian state 
either for its actions or inactions. The 
sect is driven by objectives, which 
are anchored on primitive 
utopianism. It is fixated with the 
irredentist quest to reconfigure and 
readapt the Nigerian state to an 
Islamic world created by them. As 
Onuoha (2012:2) puts it, 
 
Its ideological mission is quite 
clear, namely to overthrow the 
Nigerian state and impose 
strict Islamic Sharia law in the 
country. Members of the sect 
are motivated by the 
conviction that the Nigerian 
state is filled with social vices 
and corruption, thus ’the best 
thing for a devout Muslim to 
do was to “migrate” from the 
morally bankrupt society to a 
secluded place and establish an 
ideal Islamic society devoid of 
political corruption and moral 
deprivation’. 
  
The philosophy of religious bigotry 
which motorises the Boko Haram 
insurgency is undoubtedly at 
variance with the notion of peaceful 
coexistence, especially in a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious state like 
Nigeria. The Nigerian security cart 
has not tipped over the precipice 
because of the sense of restraint 
displayed by Christians in the face of 
consistent bombing of churches 
during worship. The Boko Haram 
has unleashed unprecedented 
mayhem on the Nigerian people, 
creating insecurity in its wake and 
calling to question the sovereignty of 
the Nigerian state. In 2012, it was 
estimated that the Boko Haram 
attacks were responsible for 750 
deaths (The Nation 2012).  
 
Apart from the human casualties, the 
use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs), targeted assassinations and 
suicide bombings have created 
pervading atmosphere of uncertainty, 
psychological trauma and general 
insecurity in Nigeria. According to 
Onuoha (2012:4), between July 2009 
when the Boko Haram ostensibly 
declared war on the Nigerian state 
and January 2012, Boko Haram had 
carried out over 160 separate attacks 
which accounted for over 1000 
deaths.  These attacks involved high-
alert security targets like the Police 
Headquarters in Abuja, Police and 
Military Barracks, the United 
Nations Building in Abuja, and the 
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Eagle Square situated at the centre of 
the seat of power in Abuja. 
 
One of the major attributes of Boko 
Haram, the one that has made its 
defeat problematic is its facelessness. 
There is no reliable intelligence to 
mount surveillance of its leadership 
or predict, with assurance, its next 
move to enable intelligence agencies 
to checkmate them. The call by 
certain analysts and statesmen for 
government to initiate negotiation 
with the group led Nigeria’s 
president, Goodluck Jonathan to 
challenge the sect’s leadership to 
identify themselves and state their 
demands as a basis for dialogue 
(BBC 2012b).  
 
Added to this is the air of suspicion 
in the security agencies and the 
presidency about the existence of 
fifth columnists that are sympathetic 
to the Boko Haram. No less a 
personality than President Jonathan 
acknowledged this (BBC 2012a). 
The implication is mutual suspicion 
and structural difficulty in honestly 
dealing with the menace engendered 
by Boko Haram. The situation is 
made even more complex by lack of 
objective modalities to assess the 
level of loyalty of government 
officials and security operatives to 
the government or the level of their 
sympathy to the sect.  
 
Certain interpretations designate the 
Boko Haram violence as religious 
war which also has the potentiality of 
leading to ethnic cleansing. The 
linkage between religion and 
ethnicity in Nigerian polity is 
because of the domiciliation of the 
major religions (Christianity and 
Islam) along discernible 
geographical lines. The targeting of 
Christian worship centres by Boko 
Haram bombers led the president of 
Christian Association of Nigeria 
(CAN), Ayo Oritsejafor, to describe 
the attacks on Christians as a 
"systematic ethnic and religious 
cleansing" and threatened that “we 
have the legitimate right to defend 
ourselves. We're also saying today 
that we will do whatever it takes" 
(BBC 2012a). 
 
Rolling Back the Boko Haram 
Umbrage? State Security and the 
Politics of Amnesty 
In the face of the apparent failure of 
the various joint military task forces 
to bring the menace of Boko Haram 
under control, it was not surprising 
that the federal government decided 
to extend the olive branch to the sect 
as part of its non-military strategies 
to bring the human carnage and 
psychological trauma, which the sect 
has engendered, to an end. In June 
2012, Jonathan sacked his Minister 
of Defence, Haliru Bello and 
National Security Adviser, Andrew 
Aziza as a demonstration of their 
ineffectiveness in tackling the 
country’s security crisis. In an 
interview, Jonathan was quoted to 
have said, “if you study the evolution 
of Boko Haram, they are changing 
their tactics every day, so you also 
have to change your staff and 
personnel to beat their styles.” 
(Vanguard 2012). 
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Perhaps the success of amnesty in 
the Niger Delta must have 
underpinned the favourable 
disposition of the Nigerian 
government to extending same to the 
Boko Haram sect. The logic seems to 
be that since it worked for Niger 
Delta militants, it must also work for 
Boko Haram insurgents. The 
amnesty programme in the Niger 
Delta appeared to have worked like 
magic. With the announcement of 
the programme and positive response 
from the militants, there were 
perceptible results. Oil and gas 
production which had suffered acute 
reduction as a result of security 
threats in the region recovered 
dramatically, rising from 1.75mbd to 
2.02mbd by the end of 2009 (CBN 
2009:130). 
 
The logic surrounding the replication 
of the Niger Delta amnesty “miracle” 
in the case of the Boko Haram is non 
sequitur. The conditions 
undergirding both scenarios are not 
the same to warrant the optimism 
that amnesty would become the 
magic wand to rein-in the Boko 
Haram menace. While the Niger 
Delta militants had grievances and 
demands, which were variously 
articulated, especially those 
encapsulated in the “Ogoni Bill of 
Rights” and “the Kaiama Declaration 
(Obi 1997; Sampson 2008; Omotola 
2009), the Boko Haram does not 
have any document that consistently 
projects its demands. 
 
The Niger Delta agitation was a 
specific reaction to three scenarios: 
one, Nigeria’s skewed federal system 
which eroded their access to 
resources produced in their region; 
two, the impunity of the 
multinational oil companies 
(MNOCs) that destroyed their 
environment and rendered their lands 
infertile and incapable of sustaining 
livelihood dependent on them; and 
lastly, the strong-arm tactics of the 
Nigerian state that tended to 
intimidate them (Ofuebe & Anierobi 
2006; Nwozor 2010). The Boko 
Haram insurgency, on the other 
hand, is anchored on the pursuit of 
an agenda of atavistic islamization of 
the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2012). 
 
The leaders of the various Niger 
Delta militant groups were known to 
the intelligence agencies which 
facilitated discussions between them 
and government agents. In other 
words, at every point, the identity of 
the militants was neither in doubt nor 
a subject of conjecture. Since the 
death of Mohammed Yusuf, the 
Boko Haram sect adopted diffuse 
leadership model which eliminated 
the identification of the sect with a 
single individual as its leader. The 
sect is believed to include various 
factions in addition to impostors and 
imitators. This poses a serious 
problem of legitimacy.  
 
The Niger Delta amnesty was 
facilitated by unfolding events at the 
national level. For the first time in 
democratic Nigeria, a Niger Deltan 
assumed the second highest position 
as the Vice President. This 
effectively shelved the allegation of 
marginalisation and paved the way 
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for dialogue. This kind scenario is 
lacking in the case of the Boko 
Haram.  
Now, the question is: what has 
fundamentally changed to necessitate 
a volte-face by the government. 
Before now, the Government 
position has always been, and 
correctly too, that it could not 
dialogue with faceless individuals 
whose grievances were unknown 
(BBC 2012b). There are other 
questions whose answers are neither 
here nor there: is it more fruitful to 
placate “ghost terrorists” or to 
uncompromisingly and aggressively 
run them aground?  Does it advance 
the cause of peace if amnesty is 
granted to a group that believes in its 
invincibility and unready to 
recognise the undisputed sovereignty 
of the state? 
 
The granting of amnesty to any 
group must undergo “justice impact 
assessment” (JIC). JIC evaluates the 
general multiplier effects of the 
amnesty against people’s perception 
of justice, that is, how the exercise of 
the amnesty by the state will impact 
on their fundamental rights and 
expectations. It also involves the 
appraisal of the amnesty within the 
context of whether the interest of 
justice has been served.  
 
Certain pertinent issues whose 
unsatisfactory resolution could 
complicate rather than normalise the 
security situation must be properly 
addressed. Such issues as the level of 
injury suffered by the people, the 
percentage of atrocities that was 
deliberately targeted at civilian 
population; effect of the injury on 
life chances and livelihood of the 
people and the level of psychological 
trauma must be satisfactorily settled. 
For instance, it is estimated that 
between 3,000 and 4,000 people 
have brutally lost their lives in the 
various attacks orchestrated by the 
Boko Haram between 2009 and 2012 
((Omo 2013; Guardian 2013b), 
prompting Rupert Colville, 
spokesman for the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), to aver 
that some of the attacks carried out 
by Boko Haram could "amount to a 
crime against humanity."(UPI 2012). 
 
While amnesty is a political tool 
deployed to address issues which 
military actions may not resolve 
satisfactorily, it has elements of 
justice. The logic associated with the 
proposal to grant amnesty to the 
Boko Haram insurgents is patently 
deficient as it does not appear to 
address the issues of justice, morality 
and ethicalness contingent upon the 
extension of amnesty to the sect. The 
federal government set up a 
committee with its attention directed 
to working out modalities for 
amnesty without a corresponding 
committee to evaluate the effects of 
the Boko Haram violence on their 
victims (Channels Television 2013). 
 
Even though the Boko Haram 
claimed they have been waging war 
against the state (Onuoha 2012; 
Connell 2012:87), the abstract nature 
of the state which places it above the 
status of a victim, coupled with the 
targets of their attacks, renders its 
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claim a falsity. There is neither 
connection between the state and 
several Christian churches that the 
Boko Haram sect has bombed nor is 
there any connection between the 
state and several private 
establishments that have suffered 
under the hands of Boko Haram 
bombings. Recently, the Boko 
Haram detonated IEDs in a luxury 
bus garage in Kano destroying over 
five buses and killing 60 persons 
(Punch 2013). Going by empirical 
evidence, the state is the least 
affected of the various terrorist 
attacks of the sect. Indeed, the 
victims are the people who are 
caught in the crossfire of secularity 
and the deployment of terror to 
achieve the islamization of the 
country. (Bagaji et al 2012:37). 
 
A fundamental question is whether 
the Boko Haram sect is qualified for 
amnesty. There are no objective 
criteria to anchor arguments on any 
side of the divide. Amnesty is at the 
discretion of the state and as has 
already been mentioned, it is a 
political tool that enables the 
government to save face, cut its 
losses and create a tabula rasa for the 
reengineering of its security system. 
But the powers of granting amnesty 
are not exercised in isolation but 
within the context of its overall costs 
to the state. The cost, here, does not 
just connote the financial burden on 
the state but includes the intangibles 
such as justice, psychological 
reassurance of the people and the 
general and specific repercussions of 
the amnesty both currently and in the 
future. The consequence of 
politicising amnesty lies in the 
devaluation and erosion of its 
relevance in the resolution of 
security problems outside the 
framework of legal and military 
actions. 
 
Conclusion 
The tool of amnesty is exercisable in 
conjunction with the intending 
beneficiaries. And its effectiveness 
lies when it is granted by one party 
and accepted by another. In the 
Nigerian context, the government 
seemed to have announced the 
amnesty programme without 
engaging in requisite consultations. 
This might have underlined the 
discordant tunes among officials in 
the presidency about the strategic 
merit of the amnesty programme as 
well as its outright denouncement by 
the Boko Haram sect, the supposed 
beneficiaries (Alli 2013; Guardian 
2013b).  
The denouncement of the proposed 
amnesty by the sect is demonstrative 
of unrepentance, a condition that 
does not conduce to amnesty. 
However, whether the Nigerian 
government goes ahead with the 
amnesty or decides to shelve it, any 
workable and sustainable amnesty 
programme must include the victims 
of the terrorist attacks of the book 
Haram sect; otherwise an omission 
will spawn the ground for the 
enthronement of anarchy that might 
create new centres of negative 
pressures and strains on the fabric of 
Nigeria’s national security. 
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